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Abstract
A large literature investigates the role of frictions in explaining labour market dynamics.
Their presence is often summarized by an aggregate matching function relating the number of job
matches to total unemployment and total vacancies. Most empirical specifications, however, are
only reduced forms with no micro-foundation.  Further, for many countries, empirical research on
the matching function cannot be carried out because data on vacancies are simply not available.
This paper looks at a job match as a transition from non-employment to employment. This
transition is decomposed into two parts, one determined by the matching technology and one by
individual search intensity. We show how the micro-founded model of Pissarides (1979) can be
identified using only microdata on labour  market transitions. This enables us to obtain a measure
of market tightness even without information on the demand side of the market. The method is
then applied to estimating the Italian and Spanish matching functions using data from the quarterly
labour force surveys.
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1
Labour markets are characterized by ﬂows of workers moving from one condition to another.
For example, individuals change their working status by moving from inactivity to participation,
from unemployment to employment, and from employment to retirement. Given the large so-
cial losses implied by unemployment, it is hardly surprising that the most studied labour market
movement is from unemployment into employment.
A transition from unemployment to employment occurs when a job seeker and a vacancy
meet through a decentralized process which can be affected by a variety of frictions (heterogeneity
in required and offered skills, different location of workers and ﬁrms, information imperfections,
congestion, etc.). As a consequence of these frictions, not all vacancies may be ﬁlled, even in the
presence of unemployed workers. Frictions are then the main source of equilibrium unemploy-
ment. It is now common to model the presence of frictions with an aggregate matching function
(see for example Pissarides, 2000, and Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001). By analogy with the ag-
gregate production function, this is a relationship that takes the stock of job seekers and vacancies
as inputs, and gives the total number of job matches as output.
The standard approach to estimating the matching function relies on aggregate time-series
data on ﬂows into employment, under the assumption of long-term stability of the matching pro-
cess. Data availability and deﬁnitional problems crucially affect the quality of the inference. While
reliable data on labour market ﬂows and unemployment exist for many countries, data on vacan-
cies are in general not available, except for a few countries where vacancy registration is required
by law (Israel for example, see Yashiv, 2000) or surveys on vacancies are conducted on a regular
basis. Instead, different proxies for vacancies are often used, with effects on the interpretation of
the corresponding results and the possibility to carry out international comparisons.
The standard approach to estimating the matching function is also affected by a number of
problems regarding the deﬁnition of the other input to the matching function, namely the stock
1 We thank Andrea Brandolini, Piero Casadio, Piero Cipollone, Brendan Cushing-Daniels, Alan Manning, Barbara
Petrongolo, Alfonso Rosolia, John Rust, Eran Yashiv, and participants at the 2003 Villa Mondragone Workshop in
Economic Theory and Econometrics, SOLE 2004 and the LSE Labour Seminar for very helpful comments. The
Italian estimates presented in this paper are based on a preliminary version of the matched longitudinal ﬁles of the
Italian labour force survey, made available for a joint research project between the Bank of Italy and Istat. The views
expressed herein are ours and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy.8
of job seekers. In practice, there is no obvious way of deﬁning the set of individuals who are “at
risk” to be matched with a vacancy. A natural choice consists of those unemployed at a given
point in time. However, evidence from many countries shows that a sizeable share of movements
into employment consists of people recorded as out of the labour force (see, for example, Clark &
Summers, 1979, and Jones & Riddell, 1999). This observation has led to empirical speciﬁcations
that include those out of the labour force as inputs (Broesma & van Ours, 1999, and Mumford &
Smith, 1999). Unfortunately, because of the lack of micro-foundation of the resulting matching
functions, these models do not help to clarify the nature of the matching process for the different
types of non-employment.
In this paper, we look at a job match as a transition from non-employment (unemployment
or out of the labour force) to employment. For simplicity, we do not consider how vacancies
are created, nor job-to-job movements. We ﬁrst show how the micro-founded urn-ball matching
model proposed by Pissarides (1979) can be estimated using only micro-data on labour market
transitions, such as those generally collected by standard labour force surveys. This enables us to
derive a measure of market tightness even with very limited information on the demand side of the
market. Although our empirical results strongly depend upon the assumptions about the matching
technology, the proposed method can be considered a useful tool for empirical analyses of the
matching function when no data on vacancies are available or their quality is poor. It can also be
useful when good data on vacancies are available, because it allows one to compare the ﬁndings of
a standard (reduced form) aggregate model with the micro evidence.
Second, in addition to estimating the transition probability into employment, we also esti-
mate the probability of a non-employed person deciding to look for a job. This probability, which
can be interpreted as a measure of search intensity, allows us to distinguish between different types
of non-employed people.
We then apply the proposed method to estimate the Italian and Spanish matching functions
using micro-data from the national labour force surveys. Because of the very similar design of the
two surveys, we can get comparable information on the matching process.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our estimation
method. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents some descriptive statistics and the re-
sults of our modeling exercise. Finally, Section 5 concludes.9
2. Modeling labour market dynamics
Section 2.1 summarizes the main features of the empirical approach commonly used to study
the matching function. Section 2.2 presents our method, which exploits the link between individual
transitions and the aggregate matching function. This allows us to derive the main features of
the matching function using data on individual labour market movements. Finally, Section 2.3
analyzes the link between individual search intensity and hazard rates.
2.1 Matching functions
An aggregate matching function is a relationship
(1) M = M(V,S)
between, on the one hand, the total number of matches M and, on the other hand, the total number
of vacancies V and of job seekers S. A matching function M(·) is typically assumed increasing in
both arguments and concave.
Under the further assumption of constant returns to scale, we have that M/S = M(q,1) =
m(q), where q =V/S is a measure of market tightness. In order to estimate model (1), one needs
to specify a functional form for the matching function and collect data on M, V and S.
The elasticities hV and hS of M with respect to V and S measure the positive externalities
(thick-market effect) caused, respectively, by ﬁrms on job seekers and by job seekers on ﬁrms.
On the other hand, hV −1 and hS −1 measure the negative externalities (congestion) caused, re-
spectively, by ﬁrms on each other and by job seekers on each other. The interpretability of model
parameters in terms of elasticities partly explains the success of the log-linear (Cobb-Douglas)
speciﬁcation M = aVbSg. This speciﬁcation is convenient but, like other commonly adopted func-
tional forms, lacks micro-foundation. This implies that it is often unclear how to interpret the
estimates obtained and how to relate them to observed labour market dynamics (Coles & Smith
1996). It is also difﬁcult to explain the effects of individual or aggregate variables on the match-
ing process and, as a consequence, these variables enter the matching function simply as shift
variables.
The interpretation and robustness of the estimated elasticities also depend on the way in
which the variables M, V and S are deﬁned and measured. Consider ﬁrst the stock of vacancies10
V. In order to get good estimates of the matching technology, good data on vacancies are needed.
When they are not available, as often happens, proxies for vacancies are typically used, such as
help-wanted indices derived from newspaper advertisements, or the number of vacancies registered
at job centres, often adjusted in some way (see, for example, Storer, 1993, Coles & Smith, 1996,
and Berman, 1997). These data sources, however, need not correspond to total vacancies available
at a given time, because ﬁrms could adopt other methods to advertise their vacant positions, such
as the Internet, private employment agencies or informal networks.
When data on vacancies are proxied by some downward biased index, the associated coefﬁ-
cient is also likely to be estimated with bias. The sign and magnitude of this bias is determined by
two sources of distortion. The ﬁrst is the standard attenuation bias due to measurement errors. The
second can be of any sign, and depends on the correlation between the adopted vacancy index and
the measurement error (see Broesma & van Ours, 1999, for an example). Because of these two po-
tentially offsetting effects, the direction of the bias is undetermined and the estimated elasticity to
vacancy should be interpreted with caution. This is especially true with international comparisons,
where the proxies used may be different across countries.
Consider now the problem of identifying the pool of job seekers S. Early studies adopt very
simple models where S corresponds to total unemployment and, consequently, M is equal to the
outﬂow from unemployment into employment (see, for example, Pissarides, 1986, and Layard et
al., 1991). Most of these studies ﬁnd that the matching process satisﬁes the hypothesis of constant
returns to scale. They also ﬁnd that a plausible range for the elasticity to unemployment is between
.5 and .7. A range for the elasticity to vacancies is instead between .3 and .5, suggesting that
the supply side of the market has a greater inﬂuence on the matching process (see Petrongolo &
Pissarides, 2001, for a review).
Several empirical studies show that a large part of hirings that occur in a given period consist
of people recorded as inactive at the beginning of the period (see, for example, Clark & Summers,
1979, and Jones & Riddell, 1999). Therefore, recent literature on the matching function expresses
totallabouravailabilityS asafunctionS=g(U,O)ofthestockU ofunemployedandthestockOof
people out of the labour force. The resulting matching function takes the form M =M(V,g(U,O)),
where M is now the total ﬂow from non-employment into employment. In the simplest case,
g(U,O) is just the sum of the unemployed and people out of the labour force. In other cases, g is11
modeledasamorecomplexfunctionofU andO(forexample, Broesma&vanOurs, 1999, propose
a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation). In these studies, the estimated elasticity to S is generally lower than
.5, conﬁrming how relevant is the deﬁnition of the inputs for the analysis of job match elasticities
(see also Blanchard & Diamond, 1989). The general problem of lack of micro-foundation of
standard empirical matching models gets even worse when the pool of job seekers S is represented
by a (non-microfounded) function like g(U,O). An aggregate function for S is neither useful to
interpret the labour supply behavior of the different groups of non-employed people (men versus
women, younger versus older people, etc.), nor to evaluate how they may inﬂuence the matching
rate.
In the next two sections, the problem of measuring the two inputs to the matching function
will be addressed using a micro model for transition probabilities.
2.2 A micro-founded hazard model
At the micro level, a job match implies a transition from non-employment to employment.
Let h be the (discrete-time) hazard that a non-employed person ﬁnds a job between time t and time
t +1. It follows from (1) that h = M/S. In the special case of constant returns to scale, h = m(q).
In order estimate this hazard rate, we need to specify a functional form for h. As for the
matching function, we can choose any function whose values are comprised between 0 and 1.
However, we can go a step forward in the study of the matching process and adopt a micro-founded
matching function. Consider the basic urn-ball micro matching model proposed by Pissarides
(1979). In this model, time is partitioned into a number of intervals of ﬁxed length (“application
rounds”) during which job seekers apply for a job and ﬁrms select from among them the people
needed to cover their vacancies.
2 Assume that, in each application round, job seekers can send just
one application for a vacant job. A job seeker knows where vacancies are located, but not if other
seekers are applying for the same job. As a result, a vacancy may receive several applications,
or no application at all. In this simple model, frictions are entirely due to the failure of workers’
coordination. Also assume that, when a ﬁrm receives more than one application, it selects a worker
at random. Applicants who are not selected return to the pool of job seekers. Under this set of
2 In this paper, we adopt the standard assumption that an application round lasts for one quarter. This assumption
is implicitly made by all those studies where the matching function is estimated on quarterly data (see for example
Storer, 1994, and Castillo et al., 1998).12
assumptions, one obtains the following micro-founded constant-returns-to-scale matching function
(see Pissarides, 1979, and Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001)
(2) M =V(1−e−1/q)





The market tightness parameter q can easily be estimated by maximum likelihood using
micro-data on individual transitions. Given a random sample of n people who are non-employed





q(1−e−1/q), if the person finds employment at t + 1,
1−q(1−e−1/q), otherwise.
Notice that q can be estimated even in the absence of data on vacancies. Thus, model (2) not
onlygivesamicro-foundedhazardrate, butalsoallowsustoestimateameasureofmarkettightness
compatible with the observed transitions, even when the lack of data on vacancies prevents direct
estimation of the matching function.
2.3 Introducing search intensity
Themodelpresentedintheprevioussectionisasimpletwo-statemodelwherenon-employed
people ﬁnd employment with probability h. However, not all the non-employed search for em-
ployment at a given time. A simple way of describing the labour supply behavior of non-employed
people is through search intensity. Search intensity is a measure of the effort applied in job search,
under the assumption that a higher intensity implies a higher probability of ﬁnding a job. We shall
assume that each non-employed person is characterized by a search intensity level s which depends
on individual preferences, search costs and the expected return of searching. In what follows, with-
out loss of generality, we normalize s to be between 0 (does not want to search) and 1 (active job
seekers).
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) propose a simple way to introduce search intensity into the
urn-ball model presented in the previous section. In their framework, job seekers simply choose13
the total number of application rounds in which they want to participate. Search intensity, deﬁned
as the individual probability of participating in a given application round, can then be measured
by the fraction of application rounds in which a job seeker decides to participate. Within this
framework, the transition probability from non-employment to employment can be decomposed
into two parts: (i) the probability s of participating in an application round, and (ii) the probability
q(1−e−1/q) that, conditional on participating in an application round, a person ﬁnds employment,
where now q =V/[s(U +O)] and s is mean search intensity in the population.
The individual contribution to the sample likelihood is now
(4) `i =

     
     
1−s, if the person does not participate,
sq(1−e−1/q), if the search is succesful,
s[1−q(1−e−1/q)], if the search is not succesful.
After suitably parameterizing s, and possibly q, as functions of observables, ML estimates of the
model parameters may again be obtained from micro-data on transitions.
3. Data
This section summarizes the main features of the data we use. We ﬁrst describe the Italian
and Spanish quarterly labour force surveys (LFS) (Section 3.1), and then present some descriptive
statistics (Section 3.2).
3.1 The Italian and Spanish labour force surveys
The Italian and Spanish LFSs share a lot of common features, both in their design and the
nature of the information collected. Therefore, even if the two surveys are not fully harmonized, it
is possible to compare individual labour market status and many aspects of job search behavior.
Both surveys are rotating quarterly sample surveys. In Italy, the rotation scheme is 2–2–
2, that is, people are interviewed for two consecutive quarters, remain out of the sample for two
quarters, and are interviewed again for two more quarters. Thus, each quarter sample consists of
four rotation groups, in any two-quarter period there are two overlapping rotation groups and, for
any rotation group, the second pair of interviews occurs one year later in the same quarters as the14
ﬁrst pair. In Spain, instead, each quarter sample consists of six rotation groups, each rotation group
is interviewed for six consecutive waves and, in any two-quarter period, there are ﬁve overlapping
rotation groups, one exits the sample and is replaced by a new one.
The Spanish LFS (Encuesta de Poblacion Activa) is conducted by the Spanish National Sta-
tistical Ofﬁce (INE), that regularly produces two types of ﬁles, cross-sectional and longitudinal.
Cross-sectional ﬁles contain detailed information about individuals, households and the place of
residence (municipality and region). In the longitudinal ﬁles, information about households and
their place of residence is omitted. This information can be easily added by matching the longitu-
dinal and the cross-sectional ﬁles using the individual identiﬁers and the other variables common
to both ﬁles. This matching procedure leads to a 100 per cent match rate.
Unlike Spain, longitudinal ﬁles of the Italian LFS (Rilevazione Trimestrale delle Forze di
Lavoro) are not produced on a regular basis. This paper uses a preliminary version of the Oc-
tober 1999–October 2000 quarterly matched data, available thanks to a joint research project of
the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) and the Bank of Italy. In the Italian LFS, link-
age of individual records is problematic because of the lack of a unique personal identiﬁer and
reporting errors in the household identiﬁer (Paggiaro & Torelli, 1999). The procedure adopted
by ISTAT matches individuals on the basis of time invariant information (gender, date of birth,
etc.) and information which varies monotonically (e.g. educational attainments). Sample attrition
and matching errors do not allow for a perfect match between consecutive surveys and on average
about 6 per cent of the original sample is lost each quarter. As for the Spanish case, where the
loss of units is entirely due to sample attrition (Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın & Peracchi, 2002), this loss of
information does not seems to affect the estimates of transition probabilities (Viviano, 2002).
Following most of the empirical literature on the matching function, we focus on quarter-to-
quarter transitions. Our estimates are based on the surveys conducted between October 1999 and
October 2000. For each country, we pool in a single dataset the four quarterly waves conducted
in 2000 (October 1999–January 2000, January 2000–April 2000, April 2000–July 2000, and July
2000–October 2000). The ﬁnal samples, consisting only of working-age individuals (aged 16–64),
amount to more than 200,000 observations in each country.
3
3 The rotation scheme of the Italian LFS implies that each individual is interviewed only twice during the period
October 1999–October 2000. Thus, the Italian pooled dataset contains transitions of different individuals. This is not15
3.2 Some descriptive statistics
Italy and Spain are characterized by high and unevenly distributed unemployment, concen-
trated among women and younger people (see Table 1).
4 Differences by gender are stronger in
Spain than in Italy, whereas the opposite is true for differences by age group. In year 2000, the
Italian unemployment rate was 8.4 per cent for men, 14.9 per cent for women, 31.1 per cent for
younger workers (aged less than 25 years), and 8.4 per cent for the rest of the working-age popu-
lation. In Spain, it was 10 per cent for men, 20.6 per cent for women, 25.5 per cent for younger
workers and 12.2 per cent for the rest of the working-age population (respectively 5.6 percentage
points lower and 3.8 percentage points higher than the corresponding Italian rates).
In both countries, labour market conditions differ considerably across regions. In Italy, the
unemployment rate in 2000 was around 4 per cent in the North-Eastern regions,
5 but close to 24
per cent in the Southern regions.
6 In Spain, it was below 5 per cent in Navarra and Balears, but
around 25 per cent in the Southern regions.
7
Panelsa)andb)ofFigures1and2showtheageproﬁleofthequarterlyﬂowintoemployment
by gender for Italy and Spain respectively. The ﬂow is expressed as a percentage of the non-
employedpopulation, andthereforecorrespondstotheexitrateM/(U+O)fromnon-employment.
The rate is further decomposed in order to separately identify those who move from unemployment
from those who move from out of the labour force. Data have been smoothed using a simple
centered moving average of the age-speciﬁc rates. In Spain, exit rates from non-employment
initially increase with age, reach a peak around 35 for men and 26 for women, and then decrease.
The Italian data reveal a similar pattern, but with a weaker relationship between age and the female
true for the Spanish pooled dataset, where a sizeable part of the pooled sample (around 42 per cent) is observed for
all the 5 waves taking place between October 1999 and October 2000, 29 per cent is observed 4 times, 21 per cent is
observed 3 times, and 9 per cent is observed 2 times.
4 We do not consider the effects of the new European Commission Regulation 1897/2000 regarding the deﬁnition of
unemployment. The new deﬁnition is more restrictive than the usual ILO deﬁnition, because people merely registered
at employment ofﬁces are now considered non-active job seekers. As a consequence, these people are excluded from
the unemployment pool. So far, Spain is the only country of the European Union that has adopted this regulation (see
Garrido & Toharia, 2003, for a discussion).
5 Trentino A.A., Veneto, Friuli V.G., and Emilia R.
6 Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia.
7 Andalusia, Canarias, Extremadura, Murcia and Ceuta y Melilla.16
exit rate from non-employment.
As in many other countries (see, for example, Clark & Summers, 1979, Burda & Wyplosz,
1994, and Jones & Riddell, 1999) in both Italy and Spain a sizeable part of the quarterly ﬂow
into employment consists of people initially recorded as being out of the labour force. In Spain,
this ﬂow is particularly important for women older than 35 years of age. In Italy, it amounts on
average to nearly half the total ﬂow for men and about 70 per cent of that for women. Thus, in
both countries, the study of the matching process must also take into account movements from out
of the labour force.
In general, an observed transition from inactivity to employment masks two transitions, one
from inactivity to job seeking and one from job seeking to employment. These transitions are
not observed because we only know an individual’s working condition at ﬁxed points in time one
quarter apart from each other. However, our estimates of the number of matches M and the number
of job seekers S must somehow take them into account. In this paper, we measure M by the number
of people who are without a job at time t and ﬁnd employment before time t +1. Similarly, we
measure S by the sum of those who look for and ﬁnd employment (i.e. M) and those who look for
but do not ﬁnd employment (i.e. those who are unemployed at t +1).
According to the ILO deﬁnition, people without a job are recorded as unemployed if they
have undertaken at least one search action during the 30 days preceding the reference period.
However, because we are considering job matches that take place during a quarter, consistency
between ﬂow and stock data requires that we include in the pool of job seekers those recorded as
inactive at time t+1 because their last search action occurred 2 or 3 months before time t+1. The
Italian and Spanish data provide a measure of this larger stock of job seekers. In fact, unlike other
labour force surveys, the Italian data report for non-employed people the number of months that
have passed since the last search action. It is therefore easy to identify those who made at least
one search step during the previous 2–3 months. On average, they amount to nearly 20 per cent
of total unemployment. The Spanish LFS does not allow us to derive such a measure, but only to
identify those who have not undertaken any search step during the previous 30 days because they
are waiting for the results of previous efforts. On average, they represent around 2 per cent of total
unemployment.
Panels c) and d) of Figures 1 and 2 show the ratio S/(U +O), which is a direct estimate17
of search intensity. They also show the ratio M/S, which is a direct estimate of the probability
of ﬁnding employment during a quarter. According to these non-parametric estimates, average
male search intensity in Spain increases with age up to 28–30 and then decreases. At its peak,
search intensity is around 70 per cent. In Spain, women aged 26 have the largest probability
of participating in an application round and, at this peak, search intensity is around 50 per cent.
Compared with Spain, the age proﬁle of search intensity of Italian men is older. Moreover, at the
peak, search intensity is almost 10 percentage points lower than in Spain. Search intensity for
Italian women is even lower and equals 30 per cent at the peak. Thus, the Italian labour market
is characterized by a higher share of non-employed people who decide to stay out of the labour
market.
In both countries, the estimated hazard rate h is around 30 per cent on average (around 35 per
cent for men and 25 per cent for women). In Spain, the age proﬁle of h decreases by age, especially
for men. In Italy, it is instead U-shaped, the minimum being reached between 22 and 28 years of
age. This is a peculiar feature of the Italian labour market, where people with secondary education,
who amount to around 60 per cent of the total population of this age group, tend to search more
intensively but have fewer job opportunities than other groups in the population (see Viviano,
2002). In both countries, older people have less probability of participating in an application round
but a relatively higher probability of ﬁnding employment.
4. Results
The literature on the matching function typically assumes that the labour market is seg-
mented, for example by skills, regions or travel-to-work-areas (see, for example, Coles & Smith,
1996). As a consequence, market tightness q and search intensity s need not be the same for differ-
ent labour market segments. In this paper, we allow both q and s to be functions of regional labour
market characteristics and socio-demographic characteristics of a person (gender, age, educational
attainment). Because q can only take non-negative values and s must lie between 0 and 1, the
following speciﬁcations are adopted
(5) qi = q(Xi) = exp(b>Xi)18
and




wherebandgarevectorsofunknownparametersandXi andZi, withXi 6=Zi, arevectorscontaining
personal characteristics and regional labour market characteristics. For parsimony, both Xi and
Zi only contain the main effects and exclude interactions between personal characteristics and
regional labour market characteristics.
More precisely, the vector Xi contains three indices of regional labour market conditions.
The ﬁrst is the fraction of workers who worked more hours than usual during the reference period.
The second is the average number of extra hours worked during the reference week. The third is
the regional separation rate at time t, that is, the number of people moving from employment to
non-employment between time t and time t +1 divided by total employment at time t. The ﬁrst
two variables capture the effects of labour demand shock, while the third reﬂects structural labour
market characteristics.
8 Under the assumption that urban agglomeration may affect frictions (see,
for example, Coles & Smith, 1996), Xi further includes a dummy variable equal to 1 if the region of
residence contains a big city (one with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants). To take into account pos-
sible seasonal effects and unobserved regional characteristics, the vector Xi also contains seasonal
dummies and area dummies (different in the two countries). Finally, Xi contains a set of dummies
for gender (female dummy), age (four age groups: 16–24, 25–34, 35–44 and 45+) and educa-
tional attainment of a person (three levels: primary, secondary and tertiary education following the
ISCED classiﬁcation).
In addition to the dummies for gender, age and educational attainment, the vector Zi contains
the position of a person within the household (single and living alone, household-head, spouse
of the head, other household member), self-reported work status (job seeker, student, other con-
dition), past work experience, and a set of dummies for the type of non-employment status (ILO
unemployed, job seeker but not in the 4 weeks before the survey, not job seeker) and the search
method used. It also includes labour market characteristics, as described by the regional separation
rate and the dummy for a large city in the region of residence.
9
The model parameters b and g have been estimated by maximizing the sample log-likelihood
8 In the two countries the separation rate depends on the characteristics of employment in a given segment. For
example, in both countries the separation rate is highly correlated with the fraction of temporary workers.19
L(b,g) = åiln`i(b,g), where `i is of the form (4), with q and s speciﬁed as in (5) and (6).
10 After
selecting non-employed persons aged between 16 and 64, the Italian and Spanish samples consist
of 116,853 and 165,798 observations respectively. Because of the rotation scheme, a large part of
the Spanish sample consists of repeated observations of the same person. So, for Spain, estimated
standard errors are derived from the “sandwich” estimate of the asymptotic variance matrix, under
the assumption that observations on the outcome variable are independent between persons but not
within.
Table 2 reports estimates of the b and g coefﬁcients associated, respectively, with market
tightnessandsearchintensity. Thebaselinecaseisamanaged25–34, notatschool, withsecondary
education, living with his parents in the Southern part of Italy (Area 4),
11 or Spain (Area 5),
12 not in
a big city, with past work experience, who actively looked for a job during the previous four weeks
by sending applications and r´ esum´ es. Regional separation rates, fraction of overtime workers
and average extra hours worked are all expressed as deviations from the country-speciﬁc means.
For both countries our estimates indicate signiﬁcant differences in market tightness between men
and women and across age groups, educational levels and geographical areas. In Italy, market
tightness is higher for people with tertiary education, while in Spain it is higher for people with
primary education only. In both countries, market tightness is negatively related to the separation
rate, the fraction of overtime workers and the average extra hours worked during the reference
week. Finally, the matching rate is lower in regions with a big city, as found also by Coles & Smith
(1996) for England and Wales.
Search intensity is higher for men, for people aged 25-34 and for people with higher edu-
cational attainment. As expected, search intensity is also affected by household background vari-
ables, labour market conditions at time t and the type of search methods used, with similar impact
9 Under the assumption that individuals are unable to adjust immediately to aggregate shocks, the current value
of variables which are highly correlated with the business cycle, such as the fraction of workers who worked more
hours than usual during the reference period and the average number of extra hours worked during the reference week,
should not help predict search intensity.
10 The sample log-likelihood has been maximized using the Newton-Raphson optimization method provided by the
ml command in Stata 7.0, with numerical ﬁrst and second derivatives, and with starting values of the parameters set
equal to zero. For both countries, convergence is always achieved after 5 iterations.
11 Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia.
12 Andalusia, Canarias, Extremadura, Murcia, and Ceuta y Melilla.20
on both Italian and Spanish job seekers.
Table 3 reports average predicted search intensity and market tightness. For each individual
inthesample, predictedvaluesarecomputedbykeepinghouseholdbackgroundvariables, previous
labour market condition, and regional labour market characteristics at their average, but allowing
gender, age group, educational attainment and region of residence to vary across individuals. Pre-
dicted values are then averaged over gender, age group, educational attainment and geographical
area.
13 14
We do so in order to isolate the “pure” effect of variation across this second set of variables.
The table also provides the average value of a number of features of the matching process, namely
the hazard rate, the search duration (the inverse of the hazard rate), the vacancy duration (the in-
verse of the probability V/M that a vacancy is ﬁlled), the elasticity to unemployment hU, and the
elasticity to vacancy hV. These indicators make it possible for us to interpret labour market dy-
namics underlying the unemployment rates of the two countries. For example, a higher intensity
implies that a relatively larger share of the population looks for a job. Thus, it can increase the un-
employment rate. However, when search intensity is associated with fairly high market tightness,
the ﬁnal effect on the unemployment rate can be of any sign.
In Italy, average estimated search intensity is equal to 28.6 per cent, that is, 28.6 per cent
of the non-employed population carries out some search action during each quarter (see Table 3).
Average search intensity is higher for men, for people aged 25–34, and for more educated persons.
It also varies considerably by geographical area, and is higher in the Southern part of the country
(Area4).
15 InItaly, averagemarkettightnessisequalto44.5percent, thatis, about45vacanciesare
available for every 100 job seekers. Large differences can be found by gender and age group, with
older people facing a tighter market than younger workers (64.0 versus 35.5 per cent). Market
tightness is slightly greater for people with lower educational attainment than for people with
13 Averages are weighted using the probability weights provided by each survey.
14 In what follows Area 1 consists of Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria in Italy, and Cantabria, La Rioja, Navarra, Pais
Vasco in Spain. Area 2 consists of Trentino A.A., Veneto, Friuli V.G., Emilia R. in Italy, and Aragon, Catalunia,
Comunidad Valenciana, Balears in Spain. Area 3 consists of Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio in Italy, and Asturias,
Galicia in Spain. Area 4 consists of Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia in
Italy, and Castilla La Mancha, Castilla y Leon, Madrid in Spain. Area 5 consists of Andalusia, Canarias, Extremadura,
Murcia, Ceuta y Melilla in Spain.
15 Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia.21
secondary education (44.5 versus 39.5). There are striking differences across regions, however. In
the North-Eastern part of the country (Area 2), estimated market tightness is equal to 82.5 per cent,
almost twice the national average.
Thus, our results suggest that differences in the male and female unemployment rates cannot
be imputed to search intensity, which is higher for men than for women, but to differences in
market tightness, which is more than 10 percentage points higher for men. Our estimates suggest
also that Italian youth unemployment is not due to lower search intensity, which is close to the
national average for this group, but to the fact that market tightness is 6 percentage points lower
than the average. Finally, the high unemployment rate of the Southern regions is due not only
to lower market tightness (20.8 per cent), but also to higher search intensity (8 percentage points
higher than the average).
In Spain, average estimated search intensity is equal to 35.3 per cent, a value that is consid-
erably higher than in Italy. As in Italy, search intensity is above average for men, more educated
people and in the Southern regions (Area 5).
16 In Spain, however, market tightness is lower than
in Italy (28.6 versus 44.5 per cent) and differences among socio-demographic groups are smaller.
Market tightness is higher for men than for women (33.7 versus 23.5 per cent), while the differ-
ences across educational levels are relatively small. Unlike Italy, market tightness decreases with
age, being highest among people aged 16–24 (37.3 per cent) and lowest among people aged 45+
(23 per cent). This partly explains why the Spanish youth unemployment rate is lower than the
Italian one. In the Eastern regions of Spain (Area 2), q is only 8 percentage points higher than the
national average, while for the other regions the differences are negligible. Finally, as in Italy, in
the Southern regions (Area 5), the high unemployment rate is a combination of a larger pool of
applying job seekers and a lower market tightness.
In both countries, and for almost all the segments of the labour market that we consider,
the job creation rate is quite low compared to the pool of applying job seekers. On average, the
matching technology is characterized by a low elasticity to unemployment. The estimated values
are .230 for Italy and .113 for Spain, close to the estimates of Burda and Wyplosz (1994). Because
of higher market tightness, average search duration is lower in Italy than in Spain (3.4 quarters
versus 3.9 quarters). Vacancy duration, on the other hand, is about one quarter in both countries.
16 Andalusia, Canarias, Extremadura, Murcia, and Ceuta y Melilla.22
Our estimates suggest that, both in Italy and Spain, labour market dynamics are mainly driven by
the demand side of the market. This result does not hold for all geographical areas, however. In
the North-Eastern part of Italy (Area 2), where q is 82 per cent, search duration is equal to only 1.8
quarters, while the elasticity to unemployment is around .488. Therefore, at least in Italy, notable
supply effects can be found at the regional level.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a simple method for estimating relevant features of a macro matching
function from data on individual labour market transitions. This method has two main advantages.
First, it enables us to derive a measure of market tightness even when data on vacancies are not
available or their quality is poor. Second, it gives us a way of modelling and estimating the proba-
bility that a non-employed person will enter the labour market at a given time. Given the particular
speciﬁcation of the matching function, we can decompose individual transition probabilities into
two parts, one inﬂuenced by individual search intensity, and one determined by the characteristics
of the matching technology.
Because of the high degree of harmonization of European labour force surveys, the proposed
estimation method can be applied to obtain comparable information on matching technology in
several European countries. As an illustration this paper focuses on Italy and Spain. In both
countries unemployment is a very persistent phenomenon, unevenly distributed between men and
women, among age groups, and across regions.
Our results suggest that, both in Italy and Spain, the process of job creation is not heavily in-
ﬂuenced by the supply side of the market. Unlike the ﬁndings of macro models for other European
countries, the average elasticity to unemployment is quite low, and the matching rate appears to be
driven mainly by the vacancy creation process.
Some sizeable supply effect can be found in Italy at the regional level. In the North-Eastern
partofthecountry, theestimatedelasticitytounemploymentisnear.50, notfarfromtheelasticities
generally estimated for many other low-unemployment countries.TablesandFigures
Table 1: Labour force participation rates, employment rates and unemployment rates in 2000.
Men Women Aged ≤ 24 Aged > 24 Total
Labour force participation rates
Italy 67.0 46.2 37.7 64.4 59.7
Spain 78.4 51.5 46.8 69.4 64.8
Employment rates
Italy 73.2 39.2 27.4 59.1 53.1
Spain 70.6 40.9 34.9 61.1 55.6
Unemployment rates
Italy 8.4 14.9 31.1 8.4 10.9
Spain 10.0 20.6 25.5 12.2 14.2Table 2: Market tightness and search intensity: Estimated coefﬁcients and p-values (for simplicity,
the coefﬁcients for the seasonal dummies are not reported).
Market tightness Search intensity
Italy Spain Italy Spain
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Constant -1.92 .00 -1.22 .00 2.17 .00 2.56 .00
Women -.28 .00 -.36 .00 -.13 .00 -.12 .00
Age 16-24 .07 .05 .23 .00 -.13 .00 -.05 .11
Age 35-44 .34 .00 -.16 .00 -.13 .00 -.30 .00
Age 45+ .66 .00 -.24 .00 -.96 .00 -1.15 .00
Tertiary education .22 .00 .01 .66 .24 .00 .50 .00
Primary education .12 .00 .09 .00 -.20 .00 -.13 .00
Single living alone .03 .69 -.07 .30
Household head .08 .08 -.40 .00
Spouse of head -.48 .00 -.69 .00
Student -1.36 .00 -.67 .00
Other -1.91 .00 -1.42 .00
No past experiences -.25 .00 -.82 .00
Unemployed: Asked friends .56 .00 .29 .00
Unemployed: Public recruitment .06 .31 .07 .45
Unemployed: Public employment ofﬁce .12 .01 .89 .00
Unemployed: Set up in self-employment -.10 .70 0.00 1.00
Not searching at time t, but before -1.52 .00 -1.25 .00
Not searching at time t -2.67 .00 -3.13 .00
Area 1 .84 .00 -.04 .38 -.01 .75 .01 .78
Area 2 1.23 .00 .35 .00 .07 .09 .10 .01
Area 3 .55 .00 -.18 .00 .06 .09 .10 .02
Area 4 .03 .51 -.03 .41
Region with a big city -.45 .00 -.06 .16 -.02 .39 -.08 .03
Separation rate -1.71 .19 -1.45 .15 2.87 .00 1.28 .16
Fraction of overtime workers -2.18 .13 -19.43 .00
Average extra hours worked -.04 .13 .02 .07Table 3: Matching technology estimates.
Search Market Hazard Search Vacancy Elasticity Elasticity
intensity tightness rate duration duration to S to V
(%) (%) (%) (quarters) (quarters) (%) (%)
Italy 28.6 44.5 36.0 3.39 1.16 23.0 77.0
Men 35.0 50.4 39.3 3.01 1.19 26.9 73.1
Women 22.3 38.5 32.7 3.76 1.11 19.0 81.0
Age 16-24 27.3 35.5 31.1 3.88 1.09 17.0 83.0
Age 25-34 41.4 32.7 29.2 4.16 1.08 15.0 85.0
Age 35-44 41.2 45.8 37.4 3.11 1.16 24.3 75.7
Age 45+ 4.6 64.0 46.3 2.40 1.29 35.6 64.4
Tertiary ed. 41.6 49.4 38.7 3.07 1.19 26.1 73.9
Secondary ed. 24.0 39.5 33.1 3.73 1.12 19.6 80.4
Primary ed. 20.3 44.5 36.1 3.36 1.15 23.1 76.9
Area 1 23.5 42.4 37.3 2.82 1.12 23.6 76.4
Area 2 24.3 82.5 56.2 1.82 1.43 48.8 51.2
Area 3 30.1 32.1 30.0 3.57 1.06 14.4 85.6
Area 4 36.7 20.8 20.4 5.33 1.01 5.0 95.0
Spain 35.3 28.6 27.3 3.93 1.04 11.3 88.7
Men 44.3 33.7 31.5 3.30 1.06 15.9 84.1
Women 26.4 23.5 23.0 4.56 1.02 6.7 93.3
Age 16-24 22.3 37.3 34.2 3.03 1.08 19.3 80.7
Age 25-34 58.1 29.3 28.0 3.73 1.04 11.8 88.2
Age 35-44 50.6 24.9 24.2 4.32 1.02 7.8 92.2
Age 45+ 10.3 23.0 22.6 4.65 1.02 6.3 93.7
Tertiary ed. 46.4 28.2 26.9 3.97 1.04 10.9 89.1
Secondary ed. 31.0 27.0 25.9 4.13 1.03 9.9 90.1
Primary ed. 28.7 30.7 28.9 3.68 1.05 13.2 86.8
Area 1 41.4 27.0 26.0 4.06 1.03 9.8 90.2
Area 2 35.3 36.7 33.7 3.11 1.08 18.8 81.2
Area 3 35.4 24.1 23.5 4.50 1.02 7.3 92.7
Area 4 28.0 28.0 26.9 3.93 1.03 10.7 89.3
Area 5 36.6 27.1 26.1 4.05 1.03 9.9 90.1Figure 1: Flow into employment, search intensity and hazard of exit into employment. Italy.Figure 2: Flow into employment, search intensity and hazard of exit into employment. Spain.References
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